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ABSTRACT 
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration) relies more and more on software to 
control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, 
facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has 
hardly been a spacecraft (manned or unmanned) 
launched that did not have a computer on board that 
provided vital command and control services. 
Despite this growing dependence on software control 
and monitoring, there has been no consistent application 
of software safeu~actic_es-andLmethodology_topp 
-- -- 
NASA's pxojects with safety critical software. 
- -- -- -- -- 
Led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety 
Standard (STD-18 l9.13B) has recently undergone a 
significant update in an attempt to provide that 
consistent y. 
This paper will discuss the key features of the new 
NASA Software Safety Standard. It will start with a 
brief history of the use and development of software in 
safety critical applications at NASA. It will then give a 
brief overview of the NASA Software Working Group 
and the approach it took to revise the software 
engineering process across the Agency. 
1. A HISTORY OF SOFTWARE SAFETY 
AT NASA 
Despite a growing dependence on software control and 
monitoring, until recently there has been little to no 
consistent application of standardized, Agency-wide, 
software safety practices and methodology to projects 
with safety critical software. NASA was formed in 
October of 1958 by legislation that, among other things, 
converted laboratories and facilities belonging to the 
previously exiting NACA (National Advisory Council 
on Aeronautics) over to NASA. These laboratories had 
a long history of conducting their own research and 
engineering practices, with little or no supervision fiom 
a centralized "headquarters" authority. 
The Apollo Program used its onboard software and 
computers as the primary method for performing the 
critical rendezvous in lunar orbit, which was absolutely 
necessary to get the crew back to earth. (This served as 
a driver for the development of microprocessors that 
would fit within the small Apollo spacecraft.) However, 
the ground software, as well as the crew onboard served 
to back up the onboard computations. In fact, 
procedures existed to completely return to earth without 
the onboard computer. The rapid development cycle of 
Apollo also meant that much of the management for 
Apollo was at the "center" level. This did not allow for 
any real standardization across the Agency on software 
creation. In fact, it tended to centralize the expertise for 
producing such software within a select group of 
engineers and contractors. This led to a view of the 
software as a system within itself, rather than a part of 
the much larger Apollo system. 
Asthe-Shuttle-Program came-into-existence, the role of 
software greatly increased, along with its complexity. 
Given the extreme aerodynamic environments in whch 
the Crbiter is reqti-ed to fly (from Mach 25 tit 4400,406 fi 
to a glided touchdown), it became the first true "fly-by- 
wire" vehicle designed (NOTE: Other "fly-by-wire" 
vehicles were actually built and flown before the 
Orbiter). The crew would make their inputs into the 
software that would actually fly the vehicle. In the 
ascent phase, the software would be in direct control of 
the vehicle. Because of this, it was realized that the 
software and computers would be directly responsible 
for the safety of the vehicle. 
The computer system for the shuttle was built with a 
large amount of hardware redundancy. Not only were 
there multiple computers to perform the same task, there 
were multiple data paths to provide commanding to the 
components. This concept of redundancy was also 
applied, in a more limited sense, to the software, with 
the development of a Primary Avionics Software 
System (PASS) and a Backup Flight System (BFS). The 
BFS was independently programmed by a totally 
separate vendor using different requirements running on 
the same platform. The concept was that this would 
protect for a "generic software problem" in the primary 
flight software. 
Both of the Shuttle software systems were designed and 
built under very tight requirements management, design 
reviews, configuration control, and testing processes. 
By the late 1970's similar processes had been used quite 
successfully for the development of complex hardware 
systems. Their rigorous application to software was 
rather revolutionary for that timeframe. The 
management of the Shuttle Program saw no reason why 
they could not be used for the development of complex 
software systems as well. This "process-driven" 
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approach to the management of software worked quite 
well for the shuttle. In fact the IBM flight software 
organization was one of the first to achieve a CMM 
Level 5 rating because of their excellent processes. 
However, as with Apollo, there was no standardization 
of these processes from the headquarters organization 
for use across the Agency. 
Meanwhile, academia and private industry started 
stepping forward with procedures and standards for 
safety critical systems and software. For example Dr. 
Nancy Leveson's book Safovare: System Safety and 
Computers, published in 1995, was one of the first to 
recognize that software was a part of overall system 
safety. Dr. Leveson's approach was to analyze the 
system as a whole and determine what hazards were 
either caused or mitigated by software. Specific 
software requirements would then be developed to 
mitigate or control these hazards. This would lead to a 
traceability between the system hazard, and the 
- - -- - - - - - - - 
software requirement[s] that would control it. This 
- - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - 
approach put software as part of a "top-down" system 
safety analysis, thereby ensuring that it would not be 
considered i11 isolation &om the other parts of the 
system which it controlled and/or monitored. 
The first NASA Software Safety Standard, (STD- 
8719.13a) was published in 1997. This was the f ~ s t  
NASA effort at a standardized methodology throughout 
the Agency to look at software as a contributor to safety 
at a "system" level. Unfortunately, this product was 
widely ignored by the software development 
organizations across the Agency. This was due to its 
complexity and poor organization. It also focused on 
concepts rather than definite procedural requirements 
organized around a software project lifecycle. 
2. THE SOFTWARE WORKING GROUP 
In 2002, the Chief Engineer's Office at NASA 
Headquarters chartered the Software Working Group 
(SWG). With designated representatives located at each 
center, its purpose "is to develop and oversee the 
formulation and implementation of an Agency wide 
plan to work toward continuous, sustained software 
engineering process and product improvements in 
NASA" [I]. Among its functions are to: "Establish 
guidelines and requirements for the development of 
software in NASA.", and to "ICecommend, draft as 
requested, review, and promote software lifecycle 
management, engineering, and 
assurance.. . standards.. .to the Agency." [I]. This 
charter made the NASA Chief Engineer, Chief 
Information Officer, and the Associate Administrator of 
Safety and Mission Assurance "responsible for jointly 
promoting software policies, [and] standards.. .in their 
respective areas of responsibility." [I] This Charter 
provided the motivation and guidance for the complete 
revision of the way that NASA developed and managed 
its software programs, which included the NASA 
Software Safety Standard. It also, for the first time in 
NASA's history, put the development of software 
strategy and procedures to the Headquarters level for 
greater visibility and oversight. 
In order to meet this challenge, the NASA Chief 
Engineer's Office implemented the NASA Software 
Engineering Initiative hnplenzentation Plan. This plan 
created 4 "strategies" in order to meet the objectives of 
the SWG [2]. These strategies address the major aspects 
of software development and management at NASA. 
"Strategy 2" has as its goals to "improve safety, 
reliability, and quality of software through the 
establishment and integration of sound software 
engineering principles and sta~dards."[2] Given this 
focus on "safety, reliability, and quality", it became 
natural to see this strategy as "software assurance", and 
to place it under the c 
organization. 
In order to meet the challenges of Strategy 2, the NASA 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance established the 
Software Assurance Working Group (SAWG). The 
SAWG is a sub-group of the SWG that focuses on the 
challenges of the many disciplines related to software 
assurance. These disciplines are best represented by the 
"umbrella" concept shown in Fig. 1. 
Software 
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Fig. 1 Software Assurance "Umbrella" 
This figure shows the major sub-disciplines that are part 
of software assurance and thus fall under strategy 2. As 
can be seen, Software Safety falls under this umbrella of 
assurance, and thus strategy 2 had the responsibility for 
revising the software safety standard, as well as the 
stadards for assEance, and engineering. To cover this 
umbrella of differing disciplines, the SAWG established 
a series of documents. These documents could be 
arranged in a "tree" fashion. The higher documents on 
the tree would be the ones that invoke the requirements 
or procedures of the lower level documents. 
The portion of this tree that pertains to the software 
engineering and assurance processes is shown in Fig. 2. 
The docun~ents with the "+"symbol (NOTE: NF'D = 
NASA Program Directive, NPR = NASA Program 
Requirement) are actually under the control of the 
NASA Chief Engineer's Office. However, they directly 
call out the "8700" series of documents that contain the 
standards and procedures for "Safety- and Mission 
Success". Ths shows the relationship established 
between the engineering processes and safety and 
mission assurance at the NASA Headquarters level. 
PIIIQII 
+ WFD 2320 l + FPDT1204 
f ig .  2 NASA Safety aiid Mission Asr~irance 
Requirements Tree (Partial) [3] 
The structure of this tree would also seem to require that 
the NPD's and NPR's be developed before the 
standards. This was not the approach taken by Strategy 
2. Instead, there was a parallel effort to develop the 
standards and the higher level documents that invoked 
them. In fact, the standards were completed before the 
higher level documents. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF STD-8719.13B 
In order to develop a new Software Safety Standard, 
(STD-8719.13B) the leader of Strategy 2 pulled together 
an Agency-Wide team of software safety experts. 
Originally, there were representatives from each NASA 
center on the team with a team leader. This team 
established the objectives for the update, along with an 
outline for the standard. These objectives were based on 
what were seen as the major weaknesses of the existing 
standard. In summary these were: 
More clearly defme the requirements (i.e. the 
"shalls") for the definition: creation; testing, 
documentation, procurement, and operational use of 
safety critical software within NASA. 
Define personnel functioizs that are necessary to 
manage a safety critical software project. 
0 Bring the standard more in line with the current 
philosophy and thinking of the software safety 
community in the rest of government, academia, and 
private industry. 
Document the good practices that are currently being 
performed, or should have beert peifornzed, by safety- 
critical software projects across the Agency. 
It was then decided that in order to write the actual text 
of the standard the process would work much better if 
the team was reduced to a "core" team of 4 members 
that would actually put the standard together. The other 
representatives would then be brought back for the later 
stages of development of the standard to get consn~ellls 
and "buy-in" from the software practitioners at their 
respective centers. 
During the development and approval, it was made clear 
to the centers that t h s  standard would be a "living 
documenty' and could be expected to go through 
significant revisions as the Agency learned more about 
the development and use of software in safety critical 
systems. Also, great care was taken to make sure that 
the document would not conflict with any "local" (i.e. 
-- 
Enter-specific) S t a T d a T d ~ c Z d u i s .  This was done 
bT?focusing o f  ~ z a t ~ ~ r a t h e F  thZn how tFdo-15- 
These "how-to" questions would be deferred to an 
accompanying software safety "guidebook". 
4. MAJOR FEATURES OF THE UPDATE 
The following sections of this paper will briefly discuss 
the major features of the new standard. In summary 
these are: 
It was completely reorganized into a "requirements 
based" document. 
It clearly states what constitutes "safety critical 
software". 
Provides a clear set of organizational and personnel 
responsibilities and functions that must be performed 
for safety-critical software. 
It spells out the linkage between software safety and 
software assurance. 
It contains requirements for "off-the-shelf' software 
that is used in safety-critical applications. 
In addition to the above, the new standard was 
accompanied by a "tri-fold" brochure that contained 
easy reference material for managers and practitioners 
to implement the requirements of this standard. 
5. SOFTWARE SAFETY PROCESS 
OVERVIEW 
As mentioned above, a major goal of the new standard 
was produce a "requirements based" document. The 
emphasis is on stating, by use of "numbered shall 
statements", what nztlst be done for safety critical 
software projects. This made the standard a process- 
oriented document as compared to the previous version 
of the standard which had a more philosophical 
approach. Some introductory paragraphs included for 
explanations and guidance at the start of each major 
section. 
At a high level, the software safety process required by 
the standard breaks down as follows: 
First of all, there is an analysis and determination of 
software's contribution to the safety of the system. The 
emphasis st this poiiit is on the entire systeq not jns: 
the software. This then leads to the creation of software 
safety requirements. These are created from system 
Hazard Reports and other generic software and system 
safety sources. The Standard further defines them as 
"new, or . . . existing, software requirements necessary 
to mitigate or resolve any hazards where software is a 
potential cause or contributor, or enable software to be 
used as a hazard control."[4] At this point, the project 
needs to provide a traceability mechanism "between 
software safety requirements and system hazards, as 
- - - - - - -- 
- -d 
well as trace thef low ao%ifXRiErFsafe?y 
- 
requirements toae~ign,- iKp1~bG&Zid-tSt .~"[5]  
Analysis is required throughout all of the stages of the 
software project's life cycle: Requirements, design, 
implementation (coding), and test. A critical part of this 
analysis activity is to provide a closed-loop feedback 
between this analysis activity and the overall system 
design. This is to ensure that any new system-level 
hazards that may involved software are properly 
mitigated. 
As the software nears its operational phase, "there shall 
be an official certification process established, 
documented, and conducted prior to the release of any 
safety-critical software for its intended operational use. 
[and] Center Safety and Mission Assurance software 
safety personnel shall participate in the certification 
process." [6] All of these activities required by the 
Standard shall be thoroughly documented. Additionally, 
these activities "shall continue to be applicable after the 
safety-critical software has been released for operations. 
The software safety requirements to specify, develop, 
analyze, and test safety-critical software, shall apply to 
all changes made to the software or routine operational 
updates (e.g., mission specific database updates)." [7] 
Further, the standard makes it clear that all of the 
requirements ~f the sta~dard will be implemented or 
formally waived. It does provide a description of the 
waiver process that can be followed if a project cannot 
meet one or more of the requirements of the standard. 
During the creation process for the standard, there was a 
significant amount of discussion about allowing the 
specific requirements of the standard to be "tailored" by 
a project. The previous version of the standard had 
allowed such tailoring of requirements. This led to the 
perception that the standard lacked authority to be 
enforced. Because of this, it was decided to address the 
topic of tailoring at the very start of the standard. This is 
what the standard says regarding tailoring: 
"While the requirements of this Standard 
cannot be tailored, the specific activities and 
depth of analyses needed to meet the 
requirements can, and should, be tailored to 
the soffivai-e safety risk. That is, while the 
requirements must be met, the implementation 
and approach to meeting these requirements 
may and should vary to reflect the system to 
which they are applied. Substantial differences 
may exist when the same software safety 
requirements are applied to dissimilar 
projects." (emphasis supplied by author) [8] 
This means, for example, that small, low budget 
projects (e.g. a payload on the Space Station) do not 
need the same number of people to perform the tasks as 
a much larger anddmOrecOm$e 
Sot have thFresources to h E a  
safety experts to perform the required analyses and 
documentation. The standard makes clear that the 
ficnction for the software safety personnel rather than the 
title or position. To help project managers understand 
this concept, an appendix was added to the standard 
showing how a smaller project can meet the 
requirements without "breaking the bank". As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, the goal of the standard 
was to focus on what to do rather than how to do it. 
6 SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE 
DETERMINATION 
In order to ensure the new standard had the proper 
application across the agency, there needed to be a 
clear, comprehensive, and coordinated definition of 
what constitutes safety critical software. To meet this 
need, an entire section of the new standard is devoted to 
"Safety Critical Software Determination". To start with, 
the standard states, "Until proven otherwise ... all 
software within a safety critical system shall be assumed 
to be safety critical."[9] It then goes on to provide what 
has been referred to within Strategy 2 as "software 
safety litmus test": 
"Software shall be classified as safety-critical if it meets 
at least one of the fc!!cwing criteria: 
a. Resides in a safety-critical system (as 
determined by a hazard analysis) AND at least 
one of the following apply: 
1) Causes or contributes to a hazard. 
2) Provides control or mitigahon for 
hazards. 
3) Controls safety-critical functions. 
4) Processes safety-critical 
commands or data 
5) Detects and reports, or takes 
corrective action, if the system 
reaches a specific hazardous state. 
6) Mitigates damage if a hazard 
occurs. 
7) Resides on the same system 
(processor) as safety-critical software 
(see note 4-2 below). 
b. Processes data or analyzes trends that lead 
directly to safety decisions (e.g., determining 
when to turn power off to a wind tunnel to 
prevent system destruction). 
c. Provides full or partial verification or 
validation of safety-critical systems, including 
hardware or software subsystems."[l 01 
In order to make sure this definition got the widest 
possible visibility, Strategy 2 made this decision to 
- - 
incluiFZiEXi%EWare A s s ~ S t a n d i E d ~ c h i s  
th? ~Ont~lilingaocument foi-a l 1 S O ~ c l ~ ~ f i o n S .  
7 CONCLUSION 
The volume of software produced and used at NASA is 
enormous. Thus, the implementation of such a 
comprehensive set of procedures and requirements will 
not be an easy task. As of the writing of this paper, 
NASA has just completed a "gap analysis" of its 
software projects to see how much in (or out of) 
compliance they are with these requirements. Also, 
NASA has decided that most of the larger projects that 
were ongoing as of the publication of the Standard will 
be "grand fathered" out of having to comply with it. 
This includes the Space Shuttle and the International 
Space Station. As of this date, it is assumed that the new 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will be in compliance. 
The tasks and requirements of developing and 
maintaining safety-critical software are potentially 
expensive and time consuming. Many project managers 
have complained that this is too much for them to deal 
with for their particular projects. However, one does not 
have to research very hard to find examples of recent 
incidents where software has played a role in high- 
profile mission failures and hazardous incidents (e.g. the 
Mars Orbiter and Mars Polar Lander failures). In 
response to t h s e  who xvould question 2ad coxp!ain 
about the effort and expense to develop this software I 
would like to close with a quote fiom Dr. Werhner von 
Braun in testimony to Congress after the Apollo I fire, 
"We are not in the business of making shoes". 
(CE)", April 3, 2002. As copied from the SWG website: 
2. "NASA Software Engineering Initiative 
Implementation Plan Office: AEIOffice of the Chief 
Engineer", January 11, 2002. URL: 
h V  
wo-bdgt-info 1 .doc 
3. NASA Safety and T~fissioii Assmaiice Requiirements 
Tree URL: 
http://www.hq.nasa.govloffice/codea/doctree/qdoc.htm 
4. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Software Safety Standard, (NASA-STD-8719.13B 
wIChange I), NASA Technical Standard, July 8, 2004. 
URL: http:/lstandards.nasa.eov/ (NOTE: Site requires a 
long-on ID), Section 4.2.2 
5. Ibid., Section 5.7.1 
67 IbidT, Sections 5.14.1 tIi~ough 5.1-4.2 
7. Ibid., Sections 7.1 through 7.2 
8. Ibid., Section 1.1 
9. Ibid., Section 4.1.1.1 
10. Ibid., Section 4.1.1.2 
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